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In recent years, governments have negotiated a number of Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements (MEAs) that include clauses regarding trade measures that conflict with 
their WTO obligations. As yet, there has been no formal dispute regarding which 
obligations should prevail, but the threat of conflict is perceived to be sufficiently 
grave for the parties to the Doha Ministerial to agree to examine the issue. Those who 
have strong preferences for environmental amenities have put considerable effort into 
fostering MEAs and are lobbying hard for them to prevail over the WTO in their areas 
of competence. The current lack of transparency caused by conflicting rules increases 
the degree of risk perceived in the international commercial environment. As MEAs 
allow trading partners to impose trade barriers on ratifying partners when the WTO 
rules would not, a perverse set of incentives is created that may lead to sub-optimal 
levels of environmental protection as well as sub-optimal amounts of investment in 
trade-related activities. The use of trade measures in MEAs is examined and 
suggestions are provided for removing the conflicting rules of trade. 
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…trade rules must: ensure deference to multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs) when there are conflicts between trade rules and 
trade-related provisions of MEAs. 
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With a view to enhancing the mutual supportiveness of trade and 
environment, we agree to negotiations, without prejudging the outcome, 
on: (i) the relationship between existing WTO rules and specific trade 
obligations  set  out  in  multilateral  environmental  agreements  (MEAs).           
 




ne is sometimes led to wonder whether there is anyone “minding the store” 
when it comes to international negotiations. While it is understandable that in 
large government bureaucracies the left hand may not know what the right hand is 
doing, it is hard to imagine that this can be the case over a large number of countries 
that are collectively engaged in long-term, complex negotiations. In this light, it seems 
surprising that a large number of governments of countries that are members of the 
WTO have also signed a variety of Multilateral Environmental Agreement (MEAs) 
that have trade provisions that contradict in fundamental ways their WTO 
commitments. For example, did it not occur to at least one of the 140-odd countries 
that negotiated The Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity – hereafter the Biosafety Protocol (BSP) – to raise the point that the process-
based labelling regime for transboundary movements of the products of biotechnology 
they were agreeing to was in direct conflict with WTO rules that only allow labelling 
based on product characteristics?
3 
Of course, the reality is that they did realize what they were doing but, given the 
political pressure to come up with an agreement, signed the protocol anyway; leaving 
the inconsistencies to be sorted out later (Falkner, 2001). If this were an isolated 
incident, it could simply be written off as an anomaly. The practice of governments 
signing separate international agreements that have inconsistent and conflicting 
clauses is, however, sufficiently common for there to be a well established principle of 
international law to deal with the problem (Isaac et al., 2002). As a general principle, 
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in international law, when there is a dispute between two states that have both signed 
two treaties with conflicting clauses in the same subject area, it is the newer of the 
treaties that prevails. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 
Article 30: 
1.  Subject to Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, the rights and  
obligations of States parties to successive treaties relating to the same subject 
matter shall be determined in accordance with the following paragraphs. 
… 
3.  When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the latter treaty but 
the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation under article 59, 
the earlier treaty apples only to the extent that its provisions are compatible 
with those of the latter treaty. 
While the law looks relatively straightforward, the reality is much more complex 
and serves to make the relationship between the WTO and MEAs opaque. For 
example, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), an MEA, was signed in 
1992 and clearly post-dates the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
However, the GATT has built-in renegotiation provisions so that, in its latest iteration, 
the Uruguay Round provisions of 1994 prevail and post-date many of the MEAs. Of 
course, there is a new set of negotiations at the WTO which, when completed, will 
post-date all MEAs that exist at the current time. From the point of view of the 
environmental movements that have been putting considerable effort into fostering 
MEAs, the results of these negotiations could negate all their work. According to 
Caldwell (1998), 
The major difficulty associated with relying on the hierarchical treaty 
argument is that the later-in-time provision of the Vienna Convention will 
not adequately serve the GATT/WTO regime or future MEAs. For 
example, the GATT/WTO regime has a tradition of negotiating additional 
agreements in new areas of trade liberalization over the course of several 
years. The latest adoption of the Uruguay Round Final Act clearly places 
the GATT/WTO regime as the later-in-time treaty in relation to many of 
the current MEAs. Similarly the negotiation of future MEAs may result in 
their achieving priority over the GATT/WTO regime. The final result 
would be a patchwork of differing treaty priorities and minimal 
clarification of the relationship between the GATT/WTO regimes and the 
MEAs. 
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The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties also states in Article 30 (2): 
When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered 
incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other 
treaty prevail. 
This provision was clearly put in place to allow countries to specify which treaty 
would prevail if the later-in-time rule did not represent the intent of the contracting 
parties. In the case of some MEAs, the signatories were careful to ensure that the 
provision was thwarted. In the case of the BSP, the wording purposely obfuscates the 
relationship between the BSP and the WTO (Phillips and Kerr, 2000). The preamble 
to the BSP states: 
Recognizing that trade and environmental agreements should be mutually 
supportive with a view to achieving sustainable development, 
Emphasizing that this Protocol shall not be interpreted as implying a 
change in the rights and obligations of a Party under any existing 
international agreement, 
Understanding that the above recital is not intended to subordinate the 
Protocol to other international agreements. 
The first paragraph provides no guidance if environmental agreements and trade 
agreements are not mutually supportive – as is clearly the case with the BSP and the 
WTO (Isaac et al., 2002). The second and third paragraphs of the preamble are in 
direct contradiction. The Understanding (third) paragraph suggests that any rules the 
BSP makes regarding trade in the products of biotechnology would not have to defer 
to WTO rules. On the other hand, the Emphasizing (second) paragraph implies that a 
signatory can refer to existing WTO obligations regarding rules for trade in the 
products of biotechnology (Phillips and Kerr, 2000). Such obfuscation was not 
accidental – it allowed contending parties to the BSP to claim that the protocol 
reflected their point of view and that they had not given anything unacceptable away 
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Thus far we have been assuming that the contending parties have both signed each 
conflicting agreement. The problem is further complicated, however, when 
memberships do not overlap. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is, 
however, clear on this point. Article 30 (4) states: 
When the parties to the latter treaty do not include all the parties to the 
earlier one 
(b) as between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only one of 
the treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties governs their mutual 
rights and obligations. 
This calls up the spectre of different sets of rules for different trading partners. In 
the case of the BSP, to which the United States cannot belong,
4 this problem has 
considerably vexed the EU, which would prefer to have its trade regime for 
biotechnology governed by the BSP rather than the WTO. In spite of the clear 
statement of the Vienna Convention’s Article 30 (4), the EU has been attempting to 
have the trade provisions of MEAs apply to non-signatories as well as those countries 
that have signed (Inside US Trade, March 29, 2002). 
The possibility of multiple rules for trade in the same commodity creates a 
perverse set of economic incentives. The reason MEAs’ trade rules are contentious is 
that they typically allow countries to impose trade barriers in a more restrictive 
manner than is the case if WTO commitments are complied with. This means that an 
exporting country that signs the same MEA as an importer faces stricter import rules 
than an exporting country that does not sign the MEA. In effect, the latter country 
receives preferred access. This has interesting ramifications for future MEAs and any 
existing MEAs that have not come into force. Typically, MEAs are negotiated and 
then must be ratified by a number of countries prior to coming into force. For 
example, the BSP has been negotiated but it must be ratified by 50 countries before it 
comes into effect. Hence, there may be considerable strategic trade value for a country 
in championing the completion of negotiations and then encouraging other countries 
to ratify the agreement, but not to ratify the MEA at home. Once it comes into force, 
non-ratifying countries enjoy preferred access to markets relative to those countries 
that have ratified. 
Given that MEAs are put in place to enhance environmental amenities, the hope 
of those who promote them is that the agreements will encourage countries that give a 
lower priority to their environment to “step up to a higher bar”. Typically then, the 
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countries that will be early ratifiers of an MEA will be those that give a higher weight 
to their environment, and likely can more easily conform to the higher standard. 
Countries that value their environment less (and trade more) will be less likely to 
ratify. As a result, the goal of raising environmental standards in countries that most 
need to will be thwarted. 
Of course, if countries that might be inclined to ratify feel that their 
competitiveness in export markets is threatened by those that will not comply, then 
they may be less inclined to ratify the MEA. The result is an increased probability that 
the MEA will not come into force. Hence, inconsistencies between the WTO rules of 
trade and those of MEAs may be a prescription for failure of the latter. They increase 
both the probability that an agreement will be reached in the negotiation stage and that 
all the efforts of the proponents of stricter environmental regimes will be for naught. 
Even if an MEA is signed by two participants, the MEA may still be sufficiently 
flawed that disputes between signatories end up at the WTO. Interpretations of the 
rules of trade are often the subject of disputes. One only has to look at the docket of 
the WTO dispute panels. Governments have not, however, given MEAs dispute 
settlement mechanisms. Hence, if there are disputes over the trade provisions of 
MEAs, governments will have no mechanism to have them adjudicated. This would 
appear to give importers a virtual carte blanche to put import restrictions in place. Of 
course, much of the history of the GATT/WTO revolves around putting limits on the 
ability of governments to act arbitrarily. The absence of dispute mechanisms reduces 
the credibility of the MEAs as viable international mechanisms and will lead countries 
to revert to the WTO dispute system for the resolution of trade issues. WTO panels, 
however, must decide disputes according to WTO rules (Isaac et al., 2002).
5 
The current state of affairs regarding the relationship between MEAs and the 
WTO is clearly sub-optimal from the point of view of those most directly affected. 
The incentive structure is biased against the successful acceptance of MEAs with 
trade provisions, meaning that those who wish stronger protection for the environment 
will not be satisfied. Those with an interest in investing in international commercial 
activities find the international trading environment more risky due to competing sets 
of rules and a general lack of transparency. This reduces the incentive to invest in 
these activities. The blame lies directly on the shoulders of governments. Their 
unwillingness to ensure consistency between the trade commitments in different 
agreements has led to the current institutional failure. The issue came to a head at the 
WTO Ministerial in Seattle. As a result, at the Doha Ministerial it was agreed that the 
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WTO’s Committee on Trade and the Environment (CTE) would attempt to find a 
solution to the problem. 
Currently, there are approximately 20 MEAs that have clauses dealing with the 
regulation of international trade, many of which do not conform to WTO norms 
(Belcher, et al., 2001). In some cases there are both sufficient consensus among the 
parties and sufficient overlapping memberships that there have been no difficulties, 
even if the rules of the WTO conflict with the trade provisions of the MEA. Three 
such examples include the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
(CITES), The Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous 
Wastes and Their Disposal, and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer (Isaac et al., 2002). As yet, none of these have been challenged at the 
WTO. This is not surprising given the large number of ratifications and the small 
amounts of trade affected. In the case of the BSP and Convention on Biodiversity, the 
quantity of trade affected will be substantial and there is little consensus on the issues. 
Thus, it can not be assumed that the inconsistencies can be safely ignored. 
The CTE does not have an easy task ahead of it. The WTO has consistently said 
that it believes that MEAs are the correct venues for devising environmental 
regulation – a stance that is considerably at variance with the power-hungry, grasping 
image with which environmental NGOs like to portray it. The mandate given the CTE 
at Doha is also weak because it is prefaced with the phrase “without prejudging the 
outcome” which is code for agreeing to enter into negotiations without committing to 
finding an acceptable compromise. Can an acceptable compromise be found? To 
answer that question requires a close examination of the rationale for having trade 
provisions in MEAs. 
Four distinct reasons for using trade measures to achieve environmental goals can 
be identified. They are: (1) coercion – using trade measures pro-actively as a means of 
coercing governments or private firms into altering their environmental policies or 
practices; (2) market failure – using trade measures to correct market failures 
surrounding the environment; (3) protectionism – using trade measures to provide 
relief from international competition based on lower environmental standards; and (4) 
preferences of civil society – using trade measures to limit market access for goods or 
services associated with environmental practices considered unacceptable. Each of 
these will be dealt with in turn. 
Trade sanctions are a time-honoured method of international coercion. They are 
used in attempts to induce governments to change behaviours which are deemed to be 
unacceptable. Trade sanctions lie in the middle ground of coercion between military 
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action and diplomacy (in economists’ terms, moral suasion). Environmental activists 
in developed countries have strongly held preferences. Through their NGO 
organisations they are formidable lobbyists in their own countries. They are often 
frustrated, however, by their inability to influence the behaviour of foreign 
governments on environmental issues. Some environmental NGOs are advocates of 
using trade sanctions to achieve environmental ends. While developing countries often 
characterise this coercion as thinly disguised neo-colonialism and a direct violation of 
their sovereignty, many environmental NGOs remain convinced of the morality of 
using sanctions as coercive measures (Kerr, 2001). The evidence on sanctions 
suggests, however, that they are not particularly effective and may actually provide a 
perverse set of incentives that encourage the continuation of the activities at which 
sanctions are aimed (Kerr and Gaisford, 1994). Hence, it seems that trade measures 
should not be allowed in MEAs for coercive reasons. They simply impose a distortion 
on markets without any assurance that they will achieve their goal. Direct negotiations 
to solve the problem, however difficult, are a preferred policy option. 
Trade measures are almost always a sub-optimal method of correcting market 
failures (Leger et al., 1999). Trade policy measures such as tariffs, however, may have 
a role to play in correcting environmental-based market failures such as transboundary 
externalities. This is particularly the case when the negatively affected country is 
unable to reach an agreement with the other country to correct the market failure using 
more direct means such as the other country's regulations, subsidies or tax regime. 
The use of trade measures for this reason is unlikely to be extensive because of their 
inherent inefficiency. Alternatives to trade measures include financial transfers from 
those who benefit from pollution abatement to those who pollute, internationally 
traded pollution permits, and incentive schemes to protect natural resources (Kerr, 
2001). Well-designed environmental policy alternatives to trade measures will mean 
that the global economy can achieve its environmental goals with less welfare loss. 
Domestic firms seeking protection from foreign competition, while they may lose 
some battles, are never vanquished. Over the last half of the 20th century traditional 
protectionists’ arguments were systematically discredited intellectually, and 
protection, when it is still granted, is most often directly identified with the special 
interest which requests it (Kerr and Perdikis, 1995). This makes protectionist policies 
more difficult to defend. Protectionists greatly covet the mantle of intellectual 
legitimacy. Recently, protectionist vested interests have begun to argue that unfair 
foreign competition arises due to less stringent (and, hence less costly for their foreign 
competitors to comply with) environmental regulations and/or enforcement of those 
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regulations (Clement et al., 1999). Similar arguments are being made regarding lower 
labour standards in developing countries. These arguments were endowed with a 
measure of legitimacy by the inclusion of side agreements on environment and labour 
standards in the NAFTA. 
While these traditional, but newly dressed up, protectionist arguments have been 
able to gain some credence on the political front, they have yet to gain intellectual 
credibility. Economists argue that environmental regulations and the quantity of 
resources dedicated to their enforcement tend to reflect the underlying social 
preferences of a society. Developing countries simply weight protection of the 
environment less heavily than rich countries. As with lower wages, in part this simply 
reflects their lower level of economic development. As a result, the lower costs 
associated with complying with environmental regulations are simply part of what is 
called a country’s comparative advantage. As Krissoff et al. (1996) state: 
Economists see little justification for trade measures designed to correct 
for these cost differences, especially if these differences reflect underlying 
contrasts in social preferences, resource endowments, and environmental 
conditions (p. 30). 
Finally, the inclusion of trade measures in MEAs arises from individuals who hold 
strong preferences for environmental goods and services even if they don’t directly 
consume them. Their strongly held preferences manifest themselves in the desire to 
make personal consumption or social choices that they consider environmentally 
friendly. They may ask that imports be labelled so that they can make informed 
choices on the basis of either product characteristics (tropical timber) or production 
methods (dolphin friendly tuna). They may want exporters to take responsibility for 
packaging materials. 
They may also not be content to restrict the expression of their preferences to 
being enabled to make an intelligent personal consumption decision but rather may 
wish to impose their preferences on others. They may lobby their politicians to ban 
imports of furs caught using leg-hold traps or to keep imported genetically modified 
organisms out of their environment. It is naïve to think that the granting of protection 
in these areas can be confined to creating conditions where consumers can make an 
informed choice and then letting the market decide. This is the intellectual equivalent 
of suggesting that if consumers wish U.S. automobile manufacturers to survive they 
simply will not buy Japanese cars. These arguments did not prevent politicians from 
providing protection to U.S. automobile manufacturers and they will not prevent the 
extension of protection in response to environmental lobbying. 
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When the GATT was established, no one but domestic producers was expected to 
ask for protection. The GATT, and subsequently the WTO, was established 
exclusively to limit the ability of governments to extend protection to domestic 
producers. One of the central pillars of this restraint was that trade barriers could not 
be put in place on the basis of the processes used in production. There was a very 
good reason for this. If trade barriers could be put in place on the basis of the 
technology used in production, it would be relatively simple to devise ways of 
discriminating against foreign products not produced in the same way as competing 
domestic products (e.g., trade barriers against cloth produced on hand looms in 
developing countries that was successful in competing with mechanized production in 
developed countries). The process rule is a good rule when domestic producers are the 
only group asking for protection (Gaisford et al., 2001). 
Environmentalists (and consumers), on the other hand, are often asking for 
protection because they object to the processes used in production. Their requests are 
not confined to environmental protection, but extend to the issues of child labour, 
animal welfare standards, biotechnology, organic production, dolphin friendly fishing 
methods, and so forth. The WTO has not been able to deal adequately with the 
production process issue (Perdikis and Kerr, 1999). As a result, those seeking 
protection have had to find other venues, including MEAs, to obtain the protection 
they desire. Those negotiating MEAs have been willing to accommodate trade barriers 
based on production processes. 
It seems unlikely that the CTE will be able to accomplish its task. First, the 
member states need to deal directly with the question of accommodating non-producer 
demands for protection based on production processes. This will not be easy because 
it will require a method of determining the legitimacy of the request for protection and 
ensuring that the process cannot be captured by traditional producer-based 
protectionist interests (Perdikis and Kerr, 2001). 
To return to the question of who should make the rules for trade, the simple 
answer is that it does not matter as long as there is a consistent set of principles. The 
rules of trade, however, need to be concerned with trade facilitation and not enlisted to 
assist in the accomplishment of other goals. Hence, it would seem unwise to adopt the 
1996 proposal to amend Article 20 of the GATT; the amendment would create a 
presumption that measures undertaken pursuant to an MEA would be viewed as 
“necessary to protect the environment” and thus compliant with the WTO rules as 
long as they were non-discriminatory and non-arbitrary (Inside US Trade, June 7, 
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2002). Given the range of reasons that trade barriers are sought, this proposal would 
give the framers of MEAs a virtual carte blanche to put trade barriers in place for 
coercive or protectionist purposes. It would seem far wiser to insist that any trade 
measures included in an MEA be consistent with WTO rules. This would centralize 
the development of trade rules and force WTO member states to deal with the 
production process issue directly. This centralization would remove the perverse 
incentives surrounding ratification of MEAs and increase the degree of transparency 
for those wishing to invest in trade-related activities. 
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Endnotes 
1.  Principles for Environmentally Friendly Trade, on the website of the Center for 
International Environmental Law, May 2001, 
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/TAEprinciplesMay1601.pdf. 
2.  World Trade Organization, Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: Ministerial Declaration, 
20  November 2001, 
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm.  
3.  This distinction is very important in the case of biotechnology because the final good 
produced using biotechnology may not have any product characteristics that differ from 
those of a good produced using conventional means. The two goods differ only in the 
process used to produce them. As labelling is likely to impose considerable costs related to 
monitoring, testing and supply chain segregation, these subtle differences in the rules of 
international trade can have significant impacts on the costs of engaging in international 
trade (Gaisford et al., 2001).  
4.  The United States is not in a position to join the BSP because it has not ratified the 
Convention of Biological Diversity (Isaac et al., 2002). Under Article 32.1 of the 
CBD “a State or a regional economic integration organisation may not become a 
Party to a protocol unless it is, or becomes at the same time, a Contracting Party to 
this convention.” 
5.  In this vein, the EU has suggested that MEA provisions should be taken into 
account by WTO panels in the current WTO negotiations. There have been strong 
initial reactions by some countries against this suggestion (Inside US Trade, 
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